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AbsTrACT
In its heyday, around the mid-twentieth century, 
psychosomatic medicine was promoted as heralding 
a new science of body/mind relations that held the 
promise of transforming medicine as a whole. Sixty years 
on, the field appears to have achieved no more than a 
respectable position as a research specialism within the 
medical status quo. This paper articulates the problematic 
of psychosomatics through a number of propositions that 
reconnect its promise of novelty to the present and to 
contemporary concerns. In contrast to classic approaches 
to ’psychosomatic problems’, which typically set out 
by denouncing the conceptual inadequacy of mind/
body dualism, the focus proposed is on the resilience 
of dualism as an empirical datum deserving closer 
analysis. The paper thus asks: what is the character 
of dualism considered under the aspect of what it 
achieves, and thus as an expression of value? Drawing 
on the thought of A N Whitehead, Michel Foucault and 
Viktor von Weizsäcker, the argument formulates a set of 
’psychosomatic problems’ informed by the concept of 
biopolitics and introduces their relevance in relation to 
the politics of participatory medicine.
There are stories that need to be ceaselessly reactivat-
ed in order to be relayed with new givens and new 
unknowns.1
In 1956, to mark the centenary of Freud’s birthday, 
Felix Deutsch wrote a short essay in Freud’s 
memory that focused on the relationship between 
medicine (‘the mother science’) and psychoanalysis 
(‘her most brilliant child’). The essay was entitled 
‘The Riddle of the Mind-Body Correlations’ and 
Deutsch had prepared it for a workshop on ‘psycho-
somatic problems’ as the starting point for a group 
discussion. The group would meet regularly for the 
subsequent 3 years under the aegis of the Boston 
Psychoanalytic Society, and their conversations 
would crystallise into a series of papers published 
as an edited book, with the title: On the Mysterious 
Leap from the Mind to the Body – A study on the 
Theory of Conversion (1959).
This paper aims to inaugurate a new set of conver-
sations on the problematic of psychosomatics, by 
reclaiming the relevance of some propositions orig-
inally formulated in that field. My first step in this 
endeavour is to reactivate the story of the discus-
sions convened by Deutsch—a story that, together 
with the question of the medical value of psycho-
analysis, has since been largely relegated to obso-
lescence. To reactivate the story means to retrieve 
what it may be still capable of conveying as a lure 
for contemporary thought, in the context of ‘new 
givens and of new unknowns’.1 Taking the discus-
sions as a starting point, my argument will proceed 
by conjugating psychosomatics with the concepts 
of biopolitics and of participation, to produce a 
reframing of the problematic of psychosomatics for 
contemporary times.
MysTeries, riddles, And The resilienCe of 
duAlisM
The phrase mysterious leap from the mind to the 
body had been used by Freud in 1917, and Deutsch 
was already proposing a ’reactivation’ when he 
chose it as the theme for his workshop.2 In prepara-
tion for the event, participants were asked to offer 
preliminary opinions on a specific question: was the 
reference to a ‘mysterious leap’ still warranted, or 
had ‘the known psychophysiological facts’ by then 
‘clarified the “mystery” that had puzzled Freud’?3 
The ensuing discussion now comprises chapter 
2 of the book Deutsch eventually published. This 
chapter—where the name of each participant is 
followed by their response to the question, some 
ranging over several pages, others barely a para-
graph long—vividly preserves for the reader the 
sense of their mutual presence, as if the text were 
repeating the gesture of eliciting contributions by 
going around the room. Similarly, it preserves a 
sense of incommensurability between the different 
responses, without attempting to elide them into 
a single coherent account. From this it is apparent 
that participants interpreted the task posed by the 
initial question in very different ways. On the one 
hand, some clearly understood it as a philosophical 
invitation to express their views on the ‘mind/body 
problem’. In this vein, they tended to respond by 
endorsing versions of what they called a ‘monistic 
approach’ or ‘monistic concept’, to argue that ‘there 
is no separation between psyche and soma’ and 
therefore also ‘no leap, no mystery’.4 In support of 
this view they cited the difference and integration 
between levels of organic complexity, using various 
examples; in some cases they also pointed to the 
ideas of process-oriented philosophers like William 
James, Henri Bergson and Alfred North White-
head, among others. By contrast, several members 
of the group referred the question to something 
quite different, namely to the clinical and pragmatic 
task of accounting for the relation between ‘mind’ 
and ‘body’ as ‘fantasy conceptions’ underpinned 
by affective investments. In the words of Peter H 
Knapp:
All patients have vague, empirical, naïve fantasy con-
ceptions of something they call their body and some-
 o
n
 21 June 2019 by guest. Protected by copyright.
http://m
h.bmj.com/
M
ed Hum
anities: first published as 10.1136/m
edhum
-2018-011588 on 7 June 2019. Downloaded from
 
2 Greco M. Med Humanit 2019;0:1–9. doi:10.1136/medhum-2018-011588
original research
thing they call their mind. Phenomena that appear to originate in one 
area seem to lead to effects in the other. These … conceptions are 
important in the thinking of individuals and are useful in understand-
ing many of the clinical data which they present.5
From this clinical perspective, accounting for the ‘leap’ from 
the psychic to the physical meant investigating the ontogenetic 
origins of the differentiation between experiences of ‘mind’ and 
‘body’, as well as the implications of that differentiation for 
homoeostatic regulation and for clinical presentations, using the 
techniques and concepts of psychoanalysis. Conceived in this 
way, the question Deutsch had posed to the group appeared in 
fact to be ‘less a question of a leap than that of a gap, that is, in 
our knowledge … which has to be filled’.6
Despite these significant differences, all participants appeared 
to share in the optimistic vision of a future where, through the 
cumulative advance of observations backed by a philosophical 
consensus over monism, mind/body relations would come to be 
clearly articulated in the context of a new science called ‘psycho-
somatic medicine’. In this sense, Freud’s mystery had become 
Deutsch’s riddle: still a difficult problem but one that, unlike 
mysteries, held the promise of a solution; moreover a solu-
tion that would transform medicine as a whole. This ambitious 
expectation had been shared by leading figures in psychosomatic 
medicine since the early days of the movement in the 1920s and 
1930s, only to be incrementally disappointed and revised in 
subsequent decades.7
As we revisit this story 60 years later with a view to articu-
lating what the notion of ‘psychosomatic problems’ might signify 
today, the first new given for us to think with is the historical 
failure of the ambition of psychosomatics—that is, the failure of 
psychosomatic medicine to have achieved more than a respect-
able, yet marginal position as a specialist field of research within 
the biomedical status quo. As we acknowledge this background, 
however, we must also acknowledge that the failure itself consti-
tutes something more than a mere negativity: it testifies, rather, 
to the resilience of the dualism that Deutsch and his associates 
had tended to dismiss, whether as a philosophical mistake, a 
naïve vernacular ‘fantasy’ or a surface impression reflecting the 
provisional lack of an adequate method of scientific observation. 
This resilience appears all the more remarkable in light of the 
fact that, in the years since the workshop and the publication 
of the book, evidence of ‘mind-body correlations’ has indeed 
accumulated steadily- enough to warrant the emergence of new 
transdisciplines like psychoneuroendocrinoimmunology, and 
the continued existence of the journal Psychosomatic Medicine 
(among others). To the extent that these have a claim to heralding 
a fundamental transformation of the dominant medical model, 
however, this claim remains largely unheard or ignored by the 
mainstream.8 Rather, the contrary seems to have happened: the 
ambition of psychosomatic medicine has adapted to constraints 
implicit in the dominant model. In his study of editorial 
processes and decisions at Psychosomatic Medicine, for example, 
Nassim Mitzrachi has documented a fundamental shift ‘from 
causation to correlation’ in the focus of the journal over the four 
decades from 1939 (year of its foundation) to 1979.9 This shift, 
he claims, occurred as a result of a complex interplay between 
internal and external forces in shaping the editors’ efforts to 
achieve legitimacy for the field in the wider medical community. 
While the scope of Mitzrachi’s explanation is limited, he is right 
in concluding that the correlational models that gradually came 
to replace the search for causal mechanisms ‘presupposed and 
reduplicated the split the [journal’s] founders ironically sought 
to supersede’.10 Instead of spearheading a revolution in medical 
thought and practice, the impulse of psychosomatic medicine 
has therefore itself been reabsorbed and reconverted into the 
dualist mainstream.
The resilience of dualism, then, rather than the supposed 
fundamental unity of mind and body, is what I propose we take 
as the point of departure for a discussion of the problematic of 
psychosomatics today. In other words, I propose we do not start 
by considering dualism as a philosophical problem or even as 
a scientific problem, a riddle whose solution would rest on the 
development of an adequate method of investigation. Rather, I 
propose that we approach modern dualism in the first instance as 
an empirical and historical datum, a given. And that we formu-
late our questions not in abstraction from this datum, expecting 
its dissolution to naturally follow from our theoretical demon-
strations, but rather starting from the recognition of dualism as 
an achievement of some importance: an achievement to which 
its very resilience, its stubborn endurance, testifies.
What is the character of dualism considered under the aspect 
of what it achieves, and thus as an expression of value? And if we 
consider dualism as an historical actuality, rather than an artefact 
of thought or a ‘phantom-problem’, how can we think about 
what this actuality contributes as an ingredient in the actualis-
ation of the organic experience of human beings, in both health 
and disease?11
These questions extend and transform the scope of Deutsch’s 
‘clinical-pragmatic’ agenda. Deutsch too was concerned with the 
differentiation of mind and body as an empirical and clinical 
datum, a fact of human experience, and as an achievement (of 
ontogenetic development). His aim was to account for the emer-
gence of organic symptoms (partly, not exclusively) as the result 
of the capacity of the ‘mind’, or mental functions, to invest the 
‘body’ with symbolic significance, on the assumption that ‘[t]he 
physiologic functions of those body parts which have become 
the representatives of … symbolised objects are … modified 
on account of the process of symbolization’.12 For Deutsch the 
empirical focus was clinical, limited to the mental and physio-
logical functions of individuals, and based on hypotheses that 
he imagined applied universally to all human beings. Without 
necessarily endorsing his theoretical assumptions or his conclu-
sions, we can agree with him on one point: the differentiation 
of mind and body (or mind and matter), and the baggage of 
connotations associated with each of these terms, is well estab-
lished empirically as a metaphor we live by—‘we’ meaning, here, 
the populations of Western(ised) societies, heirs to the scientific 
materialism that has reigned supreme since the seventeenth 
century.13 To move beyond the dualism we have inherited, there-
fore, it is necessary to understand its epistemological limitations, 
and the source and character of its empirical entrenchment in 
our lives.
Mind/body duAlisM As The sequesTering of vAlues
Modern ‘mind/body dualism’ is an instance of the broader 
configuration of thought and practices that issued from the 
scientific revolution and that by the mid-twentieth century had 
firmly consolidated into what C P Snow called ‘two cultures’.14 
Alfred North Whitehead referred to this state of affairs as the 
‘bifurcation of nature’ and traced its origins to the philosophy 
of the ancient Greeks, but stressed that it was only in the seven-
teenth century, with the systematic mathematisation of physics 
and particularly with the transmission theories of light and 
sound, that it became articulated with full consequence in the 
form of scientific materialism.15 In Science and the Modern World 
Whitehead poignantly conveys the ‘astounding efficiency’ of this 
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system of thought for the organisation of scientific research and 
for subsequent technological development. We are the heirs of 
this astounding efficiency and of the transformations it wrought 
on the world, for better and for worse. The assumptions implicit 
in scientific materialism are now embedded in the organisation 
of our institutions and in the processes by which they mediate 
both social and personal life: from our education, to our health-
care, legal, and economic systems. Modern mind/body dualism 
is reproduced fractally across these domains and, while multiple 
other forms of thought coexist alongside it in the interstices of 
institutionally mediated practice, individuals are bound to be 
summoned by its normative force on a regular basis in the course 
of their lives, in a variety of ways.
The notion of bifurcation draws attention to the genealogy 
of modern dualism. The modern concept of nature (as bifur-
cated) ‘did not originate in an ontological position, either dualist 
or monist’, but rather in an empirically based dilemma, arising 
from the proliferation of ‘local operations of the qualification 
of (natural) bodies’.16 Mediated by technical apparatus and 
by mathematical abstractions, these operations consolidated 
the scientific understanding of physical matter as the ‘ultimate 
texture of nature’.17 By the same token, however, they produced 
the philosophical difficulty of accounting for a glaring discrep-
ancy between the scientific description of reality (a ‘conjec-
tured system of molecules and electrons’) and the experience of 
reality in perception (‘the greenness of the trees, the song of the 
birds, the warmth of the sun’). The modern idea of mind, from 
Descartes to Kant via Locke, bridges and masks the discrepancy 
by explaining these two orders of reality as being ‘respectively 
the cause and the mind’s reaction to the cause’.18 The mind, in 
other words, is supposedly provoked by the characteristics of 
matter into a reaction, but adds something of its own to produce 
what we experience as perceptions: hence the difference in the 
two orders of reality (objective and subjective), now accounted 
for by the ‘psychic additions’.19 John Locke famously named the 
physico-mathematical properties of matter ‘primary qualities’, 
and the psychic additions resulting in perception ‘secondary 
qualities’.20 In so doing he highlighted their different ontological 
status as, respectively, causal and epiphenomenal; of the order 
of substance and of the order of appearance. Bifurcation thus 
points to the process whereby, starting with an ‘immediate expe-
rience’ of nature as a single reality, that experience comes to be 
split into ‘two regimes of existence’.21
Why dwell on the gesture of bifurcation? Doing so allows us to 
appreciate the specific character of modern dualism. The bifur-
cation of nature produces a situation whereby our primary expe-
rience of reality in perceptual knowledge—where the qualitative 
richness of sensory impressions is intimately tied with evalua-
tions of experience—is regarded as a secondary epiphenomenon, 
comparatively unimportant, and liable to being disqualified as a 
delusion when it does not correlate with knowledge mediated 
by physico-mathematical abstractions. The notion of bifurcation 
also allows us to appreciate the historical contingency of modern 
dualism, by highlighting its intimate relationship with the history 
of scientific materialism.
‘Framed by mathematicians, for the use of mathematicians’, 
scientific materialism yields, as we have seen, ‘on the one hand 
matter with its simple location in space and time, on the other 
hand mind, perceiving, suffering, reasoning, but not interfering 
(with matter)’.22 In contemporary medicine, this description 
translates into the conceptual distinction between disease and 
illness.23 All quality and value are expunged from the concept of 
nature/matter/disease and implicitly treated as projections of the 
mind, while nature itself is reduced to ‘a dull affair, soundless, 
scentless, colourless; merely the hurrying of material, endlessly, 
meaninglessly’.24 Whitehead is emphatic about the importance 
of doing full justice to the positive achievements enabled by this 
philosophical outlook which, as it triumphed through the efforts 
of eighteenth-century philosophes, ‘acted on the world like a 
bath of moral cleansing’.25 But his aim in Science and the Modern 
World is ultimately to highlight the difficulties and confusion that 
occur when this system of abstractions is generalised and taken 
at face value as a representation of concrete reality, particularly 
the reality of biological and human organisms. At the heart of 
modern thought lies what he calls a ‘radical inconsistency’, a 
paradox, the entertainment of which requires indeed a logical 
leap—one, however, that modern civilisation has been so far 
generally happy to fudge. The relevant passage from Science and 
the Modern World is worth quoting in full:
A scientific realism, based on mechanism, is conjoined with an un-
wavering belief in the world of men and of the higher animals as 
being composed of self-determining organisms. This radical incon-
sistency at the basis of modern thought accounts for much that is 
half-hearted and wavering in our civilisation. It would be going too 
far to say that it distracts thought. It enfeebles it, by reason of the 
inconsistency lurking in the background. After all, the men of the 
Middle Ages were in pursuit of a [rationalist] excellency of which 
we have nearly forgotten the existence. … We are content with su-
perficial orderings from arbitrary starting points. For instance, the 
enterprises produced by the individualistic energy of the European 
peoples presupposes [sic] physical actions directed to final causes. 
But the science which is employed in their development is based on 
a philosophy which asserts that physical causation is supreme, and 
which disjoins the physical cause from the final end. It is not popular 
to dwell on the absolute contradiction here involved. It is the fact, 
however you gloze over it with phrases.26
Here Whitehead does a lot more than describe a logical incon-
sistency or contradiction. Through this description, first, he strips 
modern dualism of any awe-inspiring, mystical connotations: 
at stake in the body/mind problem there is no transcendental 
mystery, but there is indeed a leap, a logical mistake. Second he 
describes the tolerance of Western civilisation for this inconsist-
ency, the fact that we are ‘content with superficial orderings’, 
although these enfeeble our capacity to think and can result in 
‘half-hearted and wavering’ solutions. And third, he critically 
acknowledges attempts to ‘gloze over [the contradiction] with 
phrases’. These attempts testify to the fact that the contradiction 
nevertheless makes itself felt, such that it becomes necessary to 
‘gloze over it’. Yet the absolute character of the contradiction is 
typically denied, and insisting on it makes one ‘unpopular’.
so… why ‘biopoliTiCs’?
Writing as a philosopher, Whitehead did not make it a central 
task of his work to account systematically for the tolerance—
and often militant upholding—of this radical inconsistency in 
Western civilisation.27 But historian Robert Young, in his fore-
word to Science and the Modern World, articulates the ques-
tion in explicitly sociological and political terms: ‘what other 
values’, he asks, ‘are served by sequestering values’ from nature 
and from facts? 28 The routine denunciation of mind/body 
dualism in abstract, epistemological terms pre-empts the possi-
bility of articulating the range of values that are concretely at 
stake in attempting to reconstruct our world through different 
concepts—and therefore what the costs, as well as the benefits, 
of such an attempt might be. This is one of the reasons why it 
is important to start with dualism as an empirical datum, rather 
than as a figment of the scientific or philosophical imagination.
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The question about ‘what other values are served by the 
sequestering of values’ points—on one level—to the coales-
cence between the abstractions of scientific materialism and 
those of liberal political economy. In his historical narrative 
Whitehead proposes that, in parallel with the ascendancy of 
the modern concept of nature as governed by physical laws, 
economic abstractions effectively ‘naturalised’ the concept of 
the market and its laws as the factual, determining backdrop 
of human existence and social life. To cite him directly once 
more, in political economy ‘all thought concerned with social 
organisation expressed itself in terms of material things and 
capital. Ultimate values were excluded. They were politely 
bowed to, and then handed over to the clergy to be kept for 
Sundays’.29 From the second half of the twentieth century we 
have witnessed the full-blown actualisation of this reduction 
of values to (economic) value with the rise and triumph of 
Chicago-school neoliberalism as a mentality of government, or 
‘governmentality’.30
Through the concepts of biopower, anatomopolitics and 
biopolitics, Foucault develops an argument that implicates the 
human and social sciences in the narrative framework already 
outlined by Whitehead. These concepts refer to a specifically 
modern form of governance that conceives biological life as a 
resource, and that is invested in fostering, administering and 
optimising life as such, both at the level of individual bodies and 
at the level of populations.31 Exercised through a range of tech-
nologies active at a capillary level throughout the social body, 
biopower informed the emergence of the institutions of the 
modern state (the family, the school, the army, the hospital and 
so on) and of new forms of knowledge dedicated to the under-
standing of human and social life as their object, including medi-
cine and economics. These forms of power/knowledge were and 
are concerned with ‘the controlled insertion of bodies into the 
machinery of production … the adjustment of the phenomena 
of population to economic processes (and ultimately with) the 
adjustment of the accumulation of bodies to that of capital’. 
They act as ‘factors of segregation and hierarchization’ by artic-
ulating rationalities for distinguishing between normal, valid 
and valuable forms of life and those that stand to be neglected, 
punished or corrected.32
The eighteenth century, Foucault claims, instituted a ‘somatoc-
racy’ that has been in crisis from the very beginning, insofar as it 
has involved the active neglect of important aspects of human life 
alongside the maximisation of those aspects that served capitalist 
economy and, through it, the state. In the course of the twentieth 
century health was progressively politicised in the context of 
various emancipatory movements, and in this way it became the 
intermediary for a degree of economic redistribution in the years 
following World War II. Foucault presents the decade between 
1940 and 1950 as the historical threshold for the formulation of 
new rights, a new morality and a new economy, epitomised in the 
UK by the Beveridge Report of 1942. If the eighteenth century 
had conceived the individual in good health as existing for the 
benefit of the state, the mid-twentieth century reconceived the 
state as existing for the benefit of the individual in good health. 
If the nineteenth century had promoted personal hygiene as a 
matter of moral obligation, the post-World War II period saw 
the emergence of the ‘right to be ill’ and its moral exemptions, 
captured by Talcott Parsons through the sociological concept 
of the ‘sick role’.33 As Parsons also acknowledged, the medical 
profession came to play a crucial role as the gatekeeper to this 
right, whose enjoyment was conditional on medical authority 
being respected, and its instructions obeyed, on account of their 
foundation in natural science.34
Biopower under neoliberalism has taken a further inflec-
tion. It increasingly operates as and through forms of self-reg-
ulation that rely on a range of ‘technologies of the self ’ while 
appealing to the value of individual freedom of choice.35 This 
context is characterised, on the one hand, by a democratisation 
of power relations in general, and of relations between doctors 
and patients (now medicine and its ‘clients’) in particular. The 
authority and autonomy of the medical profession have been 
questioned and eroded in the name of this democratisation, and 
a new form of impersonal authority has arisen in their place, 
in the form of ‘evidence’ and ‘evidence-based medicine’. What 
has remained relatively unchanged in these biopolitical permu-
tations is the bifurcation of health into a factual, objective, 
evidence-based and supposedly value-neutral dimension, on the 
one hand; and an experiential, subjective dimension expressive 
of personal values, private moralities, individual trajectories on 
the other. While the importance of the subjective dimension 
for the purpose of defining the priorities of health policy and 
practice is increasingly recognised, this is often through knowl-
edge practices that are designed to translate (soft, unreliable, 
idiosyncratic) ‘experience’ into (solid, reliable, generalisable) 
‘evidence’, in a manner that preserves and redoubles the bifurca-
tion. In practice the authority of evidence is not simply ‘obeyed’ 
but negotiated in the context of clinical interactions through a 
participatory, patient-centred model of care, about which I will 
say more below.
… why ‘psyChosoMATiCs’?
Whitehead discussed the romantic poetry of Wordsworth and 
Shelley as ‘a protest on behalf of the organic view of nature, and 
also a protest against the exclusion of value from the essence of 
matter of fact’.36 Since the days of Romanticism, the dehuman-
ising character, limitations and even iatrogenic consequences of 
a biomedical model resting on the assumptions of mechanistic 
science have been articulated in a variety of critical discourses, 
some external and some internal to medicine itself. There is no 
room here to offer even a synthetic summary of these movements 
and the ideas that animated them.37 Suffice it to say that protests 
against biomedical reductionism have been numerous and hetero-
geneous. The emergence of a ‘new subjective medicine’ and of 
medical humanities/narrative medicine constitute two of the most 
recent developments in this regard.38 The question that arises here 
concerns how far such protests go in subverting the underlying 
abstractions of scientific materialism, and the radical inconsistency 
they produce; or, conversely, to what extent they may be said to 
constitute ways of ‘glozing over’ the contradiction, to use White-
head’s expression. This is not a question that can be answered in 
general or in the abstract, with reference to the professed inten-
tions and allegiances of such movements, for in practice they can 
be internally heterogeneous.
The field known as ‘psychosomatic medicine’ has also been 
internally very heterogeneous in the course of the hundred or so 
years of its history. But I venture that it is in this field that we find 
some of the most explicit and radical formulations of the ‘protest 
on behalf of value’ with specific relevance to medicine. Some of the 
propositions yielded by this protest are likely to sound distinctly 
unpopular, even outrageous, today—not, as one might imagine, 
because they are pseudoscientific, but because they spell out the 
misplaced concreteness of medical assumptions derived from 
scientific materialism. If I repropose them here it is not because I 
think they should be uncritically endorsed, but again as lures for 
thought and spurs for discussion.
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Proposition 1: Whitehead expected the demise of the seven-
teenth-century philosophy of nature to issue from developments 
in the life sciences, particularly physiology and psychology. But 
he also stressed that ‘the progress of biology and psychology has 
… been checked by the uncritical assumption of half-truths’ from 
the physical sciences.39 We find a strong echo of this reflection in 
the address that Viktor von Weizsäcker delivered in 1949 to the 
German Society for Internal Medicine, where he offered a crit-
ical appraisal of the prospects of psychosomatic medicine, seven 
full years before Deutsch convened his workshop. The future of 
psychosomatic medicine looked bright at that point, and today 
many consider the decades around mid-century to have been its 
heyday. In his talk Weizsäcker, who had a background in experi-
mental neurophysiology, questioned whether the field was on the 
right trajectory to fulfil its ambitions. Much of what was taking 
place in the name of psychosomatic medicine, he claimed, was 
no more than psychophysiology: an effort to establish objective 
correlations between certain psychological events—like a fright or 
a pleasure—and certain somatic events, such as a vasomotor reac-
tion. But the nature of the questions being asked by researchers 
remained the same: what factors are associated with this or that 
disease? The experiments of psychophysiology would complicate 
the multifactorial picture for sure, but they would not challenge 
the fundamental mindset and orientation of modern medicine.
The true potential of psychosomatic medicine, Weizsäcker 
ventured, lay somewhere else entirely. The new medicine would 
have to stop considering organic disease/illness purely as an 
objective event—in the sense of an event that occurs in and as an 
object—and approach it instead in terms of questions that can only 
be asked of a subject, namely questions concerning motives, values 
and aims. His own early neurophysiological experiments on the 
relation between perception and movement had demonstrated 
how ‘vital crises’ and organic symptoms could be precipitated by 
a subject’s ‘proleptic’ efforts to maintain coherence by anticipating 
future movement.40 Later he wrote of the ‘proleptic structure of 
biography’, and claimed that the study of the role of anticipation 
or prediction in pathology— that is, the study of the efficacy of 
the future—ought to have ‘polemical priority’, because it had 
entirely been neglected for the previous 300 years.41 He proposed 
the ‘pathic pentagram’ based on the German modal verbs (wollen, 
dürfen, müssen, sollen, können) as a conceptual device through 
which clinicians could explore the event of illness/disease in terms 
the dynamic relationships between ‘wanting to do’, ‘being allowed 
to do’, ‘being forced to do’, ‘being obliged to do’ and ‘being able to 
do’. Each of these categories implies futurity and a mode of being 
that, in Whiteheadian terms, entirely escapes the abstractions and 
language of ‘simple location’.42 In sum, biological facts—and not 
merely their interpretations in knowledge or self-reports— ought 
to be understood as normative acts involving values and aims. The 
interrogation of values and aims therefore ought to be at the centre 
of the psychosomatic agenda.
Proposition 2: a second proposition that we find in the history 
of psychosomatic medicine has its origins in psychoanalysis, and 
links the organic and personal dimension of value to the social and 
biopolitical dimension. This is the idea that illness has value as the 
compromise solution to a conflict. In most interpretations of this 
idea the conflict is assumed to be entirely infrapsychic, and thus an 
individual affair. But we need not be limited to this interpretation. 
Consider, once again, Weizsäcker:
If organic disease is the substitute for an unresolved conflict; if if can 
be defined as a flight from conflict into disease; if it is, therefore, the 
materialisation of a conflict; then, even with its spiritualisation, the 
conflict remains unresolved. In other words the successful outcome 
of the psychotherapy of an organic disease is at the same time the 
reproduction of a conflict. When this conflict leads to thoughts previ-
ously unheard of, and to even more outrageous actions, this produces 
a surrounding environment that may not find the change acceptable 
at all. Whether the change in question is a divorce, a political sub-
version, or a religious one, in all these cases the person who thus 
recovers comes to contradict the customary order of things, and his 
therapist comes to be blamed by his friends and by the beneficiaries 
of the prior social situation.43
This proposition will not be especially surprising to anyone who 
is familiar with systems-theoretical (or cybernetic) approaches to 
psychotherapy and more generally to mental health, including 
Batesonian (anti)psychiatry.44 These approaches involve an 
‘ecological’ understanding of mental illness that addresses how an 
illness may benefit the equilibrium of a particular configuration 
of relations; how, in other words, it can perform a social function 
and represent a value for that system, if not for the individuals 
directly concerned. Psychosomatic medicine, at least in certain 
versions of it, invites us to analyse somatic disease in similar ways. 
In this sense, it points to the need for a critical political economy 
of disease/illness—one that might articulate what investments indi-
viduals make in the performance of normative forms of subjec-
tivity, and what value (rather than what cost) certain occurrences 
of disease and illness represent for the preservation of a certain 
sociopolitical order. The success or failure of psychosomatic medi-
cine might then be (re)assessed from this perspective, as Weizsäcker 
already proposed in 1949:
What has clinical psychosomatic medicine accomplished up to now? 
Whoever frames the question in these terms, and by ‘accomplish-
ment’ refers to nothing but practical utilisation within a modern in-
dustrial nation, would have to answer more or less as follows: for 
the majority of internal diseases it has accomplished nothing at all, 
for some of them very little, and even then only for isolated cases 
… I too would make a similar judgement if I felt subjected to the 
business ideal of the entrepreneurial state. … I believe then that we 
must make a clarification. The evaluation of theoretical and practical 
successes ultimately depends on the following alternative: whether 
medicine and doctors subscribe to the value judgement proper to the 
entrepreneurial state, or whether they locate the value of human life 
elsewhere.45
Proposition 3: the last proposition from psychosomatic medicine 
that I will offer here as a lure for thought follows from the last 
two, and it concerns the distinction, and the relationship, between 
organic disease and mental illness. If we posit an organism that is 
expressive of evaluations and sensitive to sociocultural values as 
part of its living milieu, then the different value connotations and 
social implications of ‘organic disease’ and ‘mental illness’ will be 
significant as an ingredient of experience, informing what consti-
tute more or less costly forms of adaptation within a given environ-
ment. Following from this premise, the development of an organic 
disease could, in principle, be understood to constitute a form of 
‘psychic saving’ with respect to other possibilities involving signifi-
cant psychosocial costs to the person. This proposition extends and 
transforms a similar one made by social psychologist Karola Brede, 
according to whom the task of psychosomatic medicine would be 
to
interpret, from a psychological perspective, the fact that psychoso-
matic patients appear inconspicuous from a psychopathological point 
of view, and that they share this inconspicuousness with organic pa-
tients. [Psychosomatic medicine] must, in other words, interpret this 
as an intentional psychic saving and provide it with a sociological 
foundation by referring it to the social control of norm-transgressive 
behaviour.46
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Brede limits this task to the analysis of ‘psychosomatic illness’ as 
a subgroup of conditions—but this is a limitation that I invite us 
to query and debate. Theoretically, what this proposition allows 
us to grasp is that at the core of what biomedicine cannot see lies 
the fact that its ‘object’ knows what it can see, and adjusts its aims 
accordingly.47
… Why ‘ParticiPation’ and ‘ParticiPating Bodies’?
Patient involvement, participation and empowerment are keywords 
at the forefront of the politics of contemporary healthcare. While 
the precise scope and meaning of these concepts can be a matter 
of debate, they now inform a wide range of activities and asso-
ciated technologies at different levels, from individual doctor-pa-
tient consultations to the development of clinical guidelines and 
research programmes. The multiplicity and diversity of this devel-
opment caution against speaking about it in any too general or 
abstract terms, but again I will venture here some propositions that 
aim at facilitating a discussion of participation as a ‘psychosomatic 
problem’.
Discourses of participatory medicine envisage a future where 
‘networked patients shift from being mere passengers to respon-
sible drivers of their health’, and involve a double emancipatory 
promise.48 On the one hand, there is the promise of a democra-
tisation of power relations in the clinical encounter and beyond. 
Explicit and revealing in this respect is the title of the second annual 
conference of the Society for Participatory Medicine, held in 2018: 
Democratising Healthcare! Me. You. Us. Healthocracy. The title 
encapsulates the contemporary inflection of biopower by inviting 
doctors and patients to collaborate as equals—their respective 
roles rendered simply as ‘me’ and ‘you’—under the ‘rule of health’ 
(healthocracy).49 In this new configuration, the traditional authority 
of the doctor is counterbalanced by that of the patient; both, 
however, must submit to the impersonal and objective authority 
of clinical evidence.50 In this sense, the promise of democratisation 
reproduces the bifurcation of nature by instituting 'evidence' as a 
supposedly neutral arbiter amongst potentially conflicting, situated 
expressions of value. On the other hand, the promise of partici-
patory medicine concerns the possibility of addressing the clinical 
shortcomings of a reductive biomedical model by incorporating 
the ‘patient’s point of view’—an expression that can refer to a 
variety of more specific concepts ranging from choice and prefer-
ences to experience and narratives. While ostensibly the reference 
to these concepts involves an elicitation of value(s), this elicitation 
is typically subject to three important constraints. First, it is limited 
to the values explicitly and consciously articulated by participants, 
on the assumption that the totality of their experience is available 
to them for expression—a fact that has not escaped critical atten-
tion.51 Second, the way in which experience and value come to 
matter institutionally depends, in most instances, on processes of 
aggregation and abstraction that translate them into ‘evidence’, 
with only limited reflection on what is lost in that translation. And 
third, the dimension of value is not deemed relevant to the expla-
nation of organic events, on the assumption that the abstractions of 
scientific materialism remain adequate for that purpose. 50
The discourse of participatory medicine thus reproduces at 
various levels the assumptions of modern dualism, whereby the 
capacities of the ‘mind’ - associated with the articulation of subjec-
tive preferences, values, experiences - are treated as ontologically 
different and unrelated to those of the ‘body’. We also see the 
radical inconsistency whereby, despite this bifurcation, the possi-
bility of an interaction between mind and body is posited through 
the notion of personal responsibility for health. This inconsist-
ency typically yields a simple alternative between regarding health 
outcomes as the result of individual choices on the part of free 
agents, or conversely regarding them as the result of blind phys-
ical determinism. Public debate, particularly on so-called ‘lifestyle 
diseases’, indeed appears to be permanently stuck in an oscillation 
between these two poles.
Earlier in this paper, in my discussion of biopolitics, I already 
indicated what other values this sequestering of value might serve: 
following Whitehead and Foucault, I proposed that we should 
look at the function of medical dualism in relation to the require-
ments of liberal political economy and the modern state. Following 
Weizsäcker, I also suggested the importance of articulating a polit-
ical economy of disease/illness based on an analysis of the invest-
ments individuals make in the performance of normative forms of 
subjectivity, and the consequences of those investments for their 
health. This appears all the more urgent and important now, in 
relation to the context of neoliberalism and of participatory medi-
cine as an expression of it. In this context, a rhetoric of work in 
the name individual fulfilment and self-realisation has replaced 
an older vocabulary of class antagonism that made the social and 
personal costs of labour relations more readily apparent. More 
generally, the neoliberal context is one where the possibility of 
resistance and refusal is subverted by the fact that, as Nikolas Rose 
famously put it, we are ‘obliged to be free’.52 A transdisciplinary 
psychosomatics has a concrete role to play in articulating the limits 
and costs—both personal and collective—of this ‘freedom’.
Against this background, the idea of participating bodies (or 
participation all the way down) is one that I propose in direct 
contrast to the assumptions and value commitments of participa-
tory medicine. Reclaiming a fundamental insight from the history 
of psychosomatics, participation all the way down points to the 
possibility of conceiving bodies themselves—and bodily events 
such as disease/illness—as expressing values and perhaps even 
socially meaningful ‘preferences’.
ConClusion
In this paper I have articulated the problematic of psychoso-
matics through a number of propositions that reconnect it to 
the present and to contemporary concerns. In contrast to classic 
approaches to ‘psychosomatic problems’, which typically set out 
by denouncing the conceptual inadequacy of mind/body dualism, 
I proposed to begin by focusing on the resilience of dualism as an 
empirical datum deserving closer analysis. Drawing on the phil-
osophical and historical accounts of A N Whitehead and Michel 
Foucault, I argued that modern dualism is an epistemic configura-
tion that involves a ‘sequestering of values’ from nature and from 
facts; and that this configuration has itself a functional utility (or 
value) in the context of liberal political economy and biopolitical 
forms of governance. This analysis placed the question of value 
at the centre of the modern problematic of psychosomatics, and 
made it possible to reclaim the relevance of specific propositions 
from the history of psychosomatic medicine that articulated the 
question of value specifically in relation to disease/illness. On this 
basis I argued for the importance of developing a critical political 
economy of disease/illness.
The grip of modern dualism on the organisation of contem-
porary societies can appear totalising, and the optimism of the 
psychosomatic movement in its heyday now seems decidedly 
naïve. In conclusion, one further lesson we might draw from the 
history of psychosomatic medicine is that the transformation of 
this mentality is unlikely to occur by way of a frontal confronta-
tion, or by the proclamation of a medicine-wide project of reform. 
In order to articulate possibilities and strategies for change we 
must look, instead, in the interstices, the cracks and the ‘frustra-
tions of established order’: in other words, to those places, those 
phenomena, where dualism fails—not epistemologically but 
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pragmatically—and where other forms of thought and practice are 
prompted into existence.53 Where are these cracks, and how can we 
sustain and nurture the life that lurks within them? It is by finding 
them, and by articulating their potential, that a new relationship 
between medicine and the humanities may be cultivated today. 
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